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Ignoring repeated appeals for restraint from the 
international community (including China), North Korea 
carried out its third nuclear test on 12 February 2013. In 
response, on 7 March, the United Nations Security Council 
unanimously adopted Resolution 2094 (2013), condemning 
the nuclear test and broadening sanctions against the North 
Korean regime.
Many people in China spoke out against the North Korean 
test. In March and April, official China abandoned 
its previous silence and began to openly criticise the 
North Korean leadership. China’s Foreign Minister 
Wang Yi, for instance, said that China “did not countenance 
troublemakers at its door”. This criticism was widely 
echoed within China’s academic community as well as in 
the official media. However, as early as summer 2013, these 
harsh critiques had already given way to more traditional 
analyses stressing Pyongyang’s strategic importance.
Reactions to North Korea’s third nuclear test  
In the days immediately following the test, some of the 
editorial writers of Huanqiu Shibao were harsh on China’s 
North Korean neighbour. They said that it would be “naïve” 
to think North Korea’s insecurity would be lessened by this 
nuclear test and they called for sanctions to be imposed. 
The editorial of 17 February said China should reduce aid 
to its neighbour. On 18 February, an editorial said Beijing 
should have the courage to oppose Pyongyang: North 
Korea’s attitude went against China’s interests, and it was 
“necessary to punish” (惩罚是必要的, chengfa shi biyao 
de) the country. China should not allow itself to be forced 
to supply a “blind shield” (一味庇护，yiwei bihu), or 
unconditional protection, to its neighbour.
Some of the paper’s other editorials were less forthright. As 
early as 16 February, an editorial said that it was “unrealistic” 
(不切实际的假设, buqieshiji de jiashe) to believe that China 
could keep its neighbour in check without the support of 
other powers. So, China should negotiate a new balance 
with other stakeholders. Even so, it had to avoid making a 
complete reversal and falling in behind the United States, 
Japan, and South Korea. A full u-turn on policy would risk 
China becoming “Pyongyang’s enemy number one” (头号敌
人, touhao diren), wiping out decades of efforts to build up 
the China-North Korea bilateral relationship. This would 
play into the hands of the other powers.
Su Hao, interviewed on Phoenix TV on 24 February, 
said China and the international community’s failure to 
denuclearise the peninsula would prove costly. In their 
articles, Shen Dingli and Zhang Liangui wrote that North 
Korea would inevitably continue “along the nuclear path” 
(核道路, he daolu). Shen Dingli said North Korea’s nuclear 
programme “cannot be stopped” (无可阻挡, wuke zudang), 
no matter what sanctions were applied. Pyongyang’s goal 
is to be recognised and accepted as a nuclear power, as 
Zhang Liangui has been saying since 2010. Shen Dingli 
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Deng says that North Korea does not share China’s almost 
sentimental feelings about the historical intimacy between 
two closely interrelated countries (唇亡齿寒, chunwang 
chihan, “if the lips are gone, the teeth will grow cold”). Since 
the 1950s, North Korea has worked hard to undervalue 
China’s role in the Korean War. In 1956, it even purged the 
Workers’ Party of Korea of its pro-China elements.
Deng worries that Beijing could in the future become a 
target of Pyongyang’s “nuclear blackmail” (核讹诈, he e’zha). 
North Korea could get rid of its current alliances and align 
itself with the US. A shift like this would seriously threaten 
China’s security. Even without this kind of dramatic policy 
change, a nuclear North Korea would necessarily have more 
weight in international negotiations and would be able to 
obtain more important concessions from China.
China must therefore review its diplomacy and refocus on 
its own national interest. It must abandon North Korea, or 
at the very least, it 
should seriously 
consider the 
option of cutting 
ties with the 
country. Keeping 
the present regime 
in place prevents 
the reunification 
of North and South Korea, which could benefit both the 
North Korean people and China itself. Reunification 
would delegitimise US regional military alliances, reduce 
international pressure on Beijing, and facilitate China’s 
reunification with Taiwan.
If the Chinese authorities do not choose to abandon 
North Korea, Deng says, they must at least try to install in 
Pyongyang a pro-Chinese regime that would denuclearise 
North Korea. Beijing should give up its “non-intervention 
policy” (不干涉政策, bu ganshe zhengce) and develop 
a system of “limited intervention” (有限干涉, youxian 
ganshe) that could better serve its national interest.
A speedy return to dogmatism  
Deng Yuwen’s proposal was harshly criticised by Chinese 
experts such as Ren Weidong, a researcher at the China 
Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR). 
Ren said that the US was most to blame for tensions on 
the peninsula, because the US has resituated the North 
Korean problem within a regional context that is marked by 
American dominance. Instead of overturning China-North 
Korea relations, the connection between China and North 
Korea should be strengthened.
In his 20 March article, Ren Weidong said that the Korean 
peninsula is a key element in the US’s long-term strategy. 
Ever since the fall of the USSR, the US has refused to 
normalise its relations with North Korea (whereas Beijing 
wrote that the US has always accepted the nuclearisation 
of other nations after the fact. Once Obama leaves office 
in January 2017, the US might well accept North Korea as 
a nuclear power, as might the international community as 
a whole, since it “would have no other choice” (无奈接受, 
wunai jieshou).
In the Phoenix TV broadcast, Shi Yinhong said that China 
could not be held responsible for North Korea’s behaviour, 
since North Korea acts in favour of its own national 
interests and has no regard for China’s. Peng Guangqian 
summed the discussion up: North Korea’s nuclearisation is 
not solely China’s problem; China is not the source of the 
problem; and China alone cannot solve the problem.
Should China abandon North Korea?
Deng Yuwen’s argument for abandoning North Korea 
in the Financial Times of 27 February was something of 
a bombshell, although the proposal gained much more 
attention in Western circles than within the academic 
debate in China.28 The full version of the article, published 
in Liaowang Zhongguo in March, presents the writer’s 
proposal in greater detail. He says that China can continue 
to support North Korea for historical, ideological, and 
strategic reasons. Or, it can choose to “abandon” its 
neighbour (放弃, fangqi), which has spiralled off control 
and become a “bad asset” (负资产, fu zichan). 
Deng goes on to try to dismantle the reasons for continuing 
to support North Korea. He says that the ideological 
argument for supporting North Korea is fallacious. China’s 
foreign policy should not be and is not based on ideology. If 
it were, China would have no relations with the West. In any 
case, the differences between the ideologies of China and 
North Korea are greater than those between the ideologies 
of China and the West.
He argues that the strategic argument is largely exaggerated. 
During the Cold War, North Korea was a useful buffer 
zone, but the emergence of modern technological warfare 
has made this function obsolete. Moreover, a buffer zone 
is supposed to keep out danger, but now the buffer zone 
is itself the source of the danger. China must avoid being 
dragged into a war with the US on behalf of another country, 
especially because it has no need of the alliance to ensure 
its security.
In spite of expectations raised by Kim Jong-un’s rise to 
power, North Korea is not reforming. In fact, Deng says, the 
country is unreformable. Any attempt at reform would lead 
to the collapse of the regime, which is anyway unsustainable 
in the long term. So, it is irrational for China to maintain 
special relations with the state.
28   Deng Yuwen, “China should abandon North Korea”, Financial Times, 
27 February 2013, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9e2f68b2-
7c5c-11e2-99f0-00144feabdc0.html.
In North Korea, Beijing should 
give up its “non-intervention 
policy” and develop a system 
of “limited intervention” that 
could better serve its national 
interest.
11
a sign of Beijing’s continuing attachment to Pyongyang. 
China is not going to dissolve ties with its neighbour. 
However, Yu says that a change in the relationship between 
the two countries is needed. During the Cold War, China’s 
fate was very closely bound up with that of North Korea. But 
since the break-up of the Soviet bloc, the two neighbours 
have taken different directions. China has broken free of its 
Cold War mindset and normalised its relations with South 
Korea. Even though China still has to manage its strategic 
rivalry with the US, it has largely benefited from the post-
Cold War period of stability. On the other hand, North Korea 
remains belligerent, and Pyongyang’s nuclear programme 
has created a point of disagreement between the two 
countries. China, which is opposed both to an alliance with 
the US and to North Korea’s nuclear programme, wants to 
promote collective security and to turn the 1953 armistice 
into a peace treaty. If this is to be achieved, both North 
Korea and the US will have to modify their behaviour, get 
beyond their Cold War mentalities, and start making a 
positive contribution to building peace.
has recognised Seoul), even including it in President 
George W. Bush’s “Axis of Evil”.29 The US’s long-term 
goal is to preserve the division of the peninsula in order 
to guarantee the US military presence in South Korea and 
secure the dependence of South Korea and Japan on the US. 
Washington wants to use the Korean peninsula to contain 
China. One of Washington’s goals is thus to create friction 
between Beijing and Pyongyang. If relations deteriorate 
and China stops supporting the Pyongyang regime, South 
Korea will be able to annex the North, which would benefit 
the US and establish a new military demarcation along the 
Yalu River.
To prevent this from happening, China must invest in 
strengthening its relationship with North Korea to act 
as a counterbalance to the US. Ren says that American 
“hegemony” is unlikely to change and that it is a mistake to 
think that if China abandoned North Korea, the US would 
withdraw its troops from South Korea and Japan.  
Ren explains the reasons why he believes that North 
Korea’s nuclear and ballistic programme will not lead to an 
arms race. South Korea has no need to be concerned, since 
the programme is not aimed at South Korea, but instead is 
intended to act as a deterrent against the US. The US will 
not allow Japan to develop its own nuclear programme. 
And there has been a double standard in the international 
non-proliferation system from the very beginning (such as, 
for example, the cases of Israel and India).
Ren Weidong repeated his attack on Deng Yuwen’s 
arguments in his article of 9 July. He writes that North 
Korea remains a “strategic barrier” (战略屏障, zhanlüe 
pingzhang) to American dominance. If, as some people 
think, modern warfare makes North Korea’s function as a 
buffer zone irrelevant, then why does the US maintain its 
military presence in South Korea? Beijing should not try to 
get closer to Seoul at Pyongyang’s expense, because Seoul 
is an ally of Washington in the US “Pivot to Asia” strategy. 
Since American troops are stationed on its soil, South Korea 
is not fully independent and must remain within America’s 
“strategic orbit” (战略轨道, zhanlüe guidao). 
Consensus for a modest shift in relations
Deng Yuwen and Ren Weidong represent the two extremes 
on the spectrum of Chinese opinion about North Korea. In 
between these two poles, a broad consensus has emerged 
for a limited development of China-North Korea relations. 
Yu Shaohua’s article is representative of this new consensus. 
She talks about Chinese Vice President Li Yuanchao’s July 
trip to North Korea, during which he participated in the 
commemorations in Pyongyang on 27 July of the sixtieth 
anniversary of the signing of the Panmunjom armistice that 
ended the Korean War. Li’s meeting with Kim Jong-un is 
29   In his State of the Union address on 29 January 2002, President George 
W. Bush spoke of an “Axis of Evil” made up of Iraq, Iran, and North 
Korea, three countries that he said represented a major threat to world 
peace. 
